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MY GENETIC CHILD MAY NOT BE MY LEGAL 
CHILD? A FUNCTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE ON 
THE NEED FOR SURROGACY EQUALITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
RACHEL I. GEWURZ* 
ABSTRACT 
While assisted reproductive technology, and surrogacy in particular, 
may appear to be a straightforward solution to infertility, the legal field is 
extremely complex. The patchwork of laws across the United States leaves 
intended parents at risk for a court to deny legal rights to their biological 
child. This Note will examine the complexities of surrogacy agreements and 
the need for a federal, uniform surrogacy law under the sociological 
functionalist theory of society.  
INTRODUCTION 
A child born using assisted reproductive technology1 can have up to five 
potential “parents.”2 One or two intended parents3 can have a child using a 
 
 
* Notes Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. Candidate, Washington 
University School of Law, Class of 2020; Member of Washington University Children’s Rights Clinic; 
B.S. in Human Development and Family Science, The Ohio State University, Class of 2017. 
1. Assisted Reproductive Technology treats infertility through in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
fertility treatments.  In IVF, eggs are surgically removed from the ovary and mixed with sperm outside 
the body in a Petri dish ("in vitro" is Latin for "in glass"). After about 40 hours, the eggs are examined 
to see if they have become fertilized by the sperm and are dividing into cells. These fertilized eggs 
(embryos) are then placed in the women's uterus, thus bypassing the fallopian tubes.  What is In Vitro 
Fertilization?, SOCIETY FOR ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, 
https://www.sart.org/SART_Frequent_Questions/ [https://perma.cc/78WE-HR9L] (last visited Jan. 19, 
2019). An individual or a couple who utilizes IVF can carry a fetus using either their own genetic 
material or by using donor eggs, sperm, or embryos. The individual or couple may sometimes use a 
surrogate. Assisted Reproductive Technology, MEDLINE PLUS, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH AND U.S. NAT’L 
LIBRARY OF MEDICINE (May 14, 2018), https://medlineplus.gov/assistedreproductivetechnology.html 
[https://perma.cc/5B4X-77NF].  
2. The legal definition of a parent is the “lawful father or mother of someone.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, Parent (11th ed. 2019).  
3. An intended parent is, “an individual or couple who commission and become the legal 
parent/s of a child birthed by a surrogate.” Intended Parent(s), SURROGACY 360,  
https://surrogacy360.org/considering-surrogacy/definitions/ [https://perma.cc/8H66-NQNN] (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2020).  
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surrogate4 and either an embryo donor or an egg or sperm donor. Under the 
Uniform Parentage Act, a woman who gives birth to a child is presumed to 
be the biological and legal mother, and if she is married, her husband is 
presumed to be the biological and legal father.5 This is often not the case in 
third-party reproduction,6 where the intended parents7 use a surrogate to 
carry the fetus. Because of this legal presumption, intended parents who use 
a surrogate must establish legal parentage. In most cases, a judge must order 
an acknowledgement of legal parentage,8 which in some states must occur 
after the birth.9 For individuals struggling with infertility, surrogacy 
provides a solution that enables them to raise a child of their own genes.10 
However, the lack of uniform surrogacy legislation in our country frustrates 
people who seek to use third party reproduction. To avoid inconsistent 
results when adjudicating parental rights or, in the most extreme cases, to 
avoid facing criminal punishment,11 these individuals have no choice but to 
explore adoption or to engage in reproductive tourism.12  
This Note examines the necessity of uniform surrogacy legislation and, 
under functionalist theory, analyzes how societal equilibrium can be 
 
 
4. A surrogate mother is “a woman who becomes pregnant usually by artificial insemination or 
by implantation of a fertilized egg created by in vitro fertilization for the purpose of carrying the fetus 
to term for another person or persons.” Surrogate Mother, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/surrogate%20mother [https://perma.cc/XBY8-YLLX] (last visited Jan. 29, 
2020). A surrogate is also referred to as a gestational carrier and these terms are used interchangeably 
throughout this Note.  
5. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2017). The legal presumption of parentage is applicable to same-
sex couples when children are born to couples who are married or where their state recognizes their civil 
union or domestic partnership at the time the child is born. Legal Recognition of LGBT Families, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS (Sept. 2016), http://www.nclrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/Legal_Recognition_of_LGBT_Families.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9SE-9KBH]. 
6. Third party reproduction “refers to the use of eggs, sperm, or embryos that have been donated 
by a third person (donor) to enable an infertile individual or couple (intended recipient) to become 
parents.” Third Party Reproduction, AM. SOC’Y REPROD. MED., https://www.asrm.org/topics/topics-
index/third-party-reproduction [https://perma.cc/K8SN-APYR] (last visited Dec. 26, 2018).  
7. The use of “intended parents” throughout this Note also refers to a single intended parent, 
regardless of gender.  
8. Establishing Parentage in Surrogacy, AMERICAN SURROGACY & SURROGATE.COM, 
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legal-information/establishing-parentage-
in-surrogacy [https://perma.cc/Q4ZZ-7ND9] (last visited Dec. 26, 2018).  
9.  Id.  
10. “About 10 percent of women under the age of 44 (6.1 million) have difficulty getting 
pregnant or staying pregnant . . . Struggling with infertility causes many painful emotions, including 
grief, guilt, anxiety, and depression . . . For women, the stress of fertility treatment and the side effects 
of fertility medications can take a huge psychological toll.” Depression and Infertility: How Infertility 
Affects Employees, WINFERTILITY, https://www.winfertility.com/depression-and-infertility 
[https://perma.cc/K7A7-CTKH] (last visited Jan. 29, 2020).  
11. See discussion infra Section IV.   
12. Reproductive Tourism is the “willingness to travel for ART [Assisted Reproductive 
Technology] and the practices that facilitate fertility travel.” Lisa C. Ikemoto, Note, Reproductive 
Tourism: Equality Concerns In The Global Market For Fertility Services, 27 LAW & INEQ. 277 (2009).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/8
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achieved by allowing surrogacy to preserve the role of the family. Section I 
outlines the history of surrogacy and the legal distinctions between 
traditional and gestational surrogacy. Section II introduces the sociological 
functionalist theory and analyzes the interaction of functionalism and 
surrogacy. Section III introduces compensated surrogacy agreements and 
analyzes the morality of compensation against functionalism. Section IV 
outlines court-approved remedies for a breach of the surrogacy contract. 
This section additionally analyzes functionalist views of appropriate 
remedies. Section V groups states based on the degree of legislation 
presently enacted. This section additionally analyzes specific state policies 
against the functionalist theory. Section VI proposes Congress enact a 
uniform, comprehensive surrogacy statute under its Commerce Clause 
power. This Note concludes that under functionalist theory, uniform 
surrogacy legislation is necessary for our society to properly function. 
I.  HISTORY OF SURROGACY AND DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN TRADITIONAL 
VERSUS GESTATIONAL SURROGACY 
Gestational surrogacy was first successful in 1985.13 But despite the 
longevity of the field, surrogacy law and the legal rights of the parties 
remain largely unclear. Since there is no federal surrogacy legislation,14 
state legislatures have discretion to implement their own surrogacy laws. 
However, very few states have clear and comprehensive legislation. In fact, 
most states have not enacted any legislation, and judges issue parentage 
judgments on an inconsistent basis.15 As a result, intended parents may not 
have the rights they expected at the time of contracting.  
There are two types of surrogacy: traditional surrogacy and gestational 
surrogacy. In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate carries a child conceived 
using her egg and the sperm of the intended father.16 In these cases, the child 
will be genetically related to the surrogate and the intended father, but not 
 
 
13. Modern IVF Technology was established in 1978 when the first successful IVF embryo 
transfer occurred in the United Kingdom. Later, in 1982, the first baby conceived via egg donation was 
born. Doctors were then able to combine the two innovative procedures in 1985. The History of 
Surrogacy, Abridged, CONCEIVEABILITIES: ALL THINGS CONCEIVABLE BLOG (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.conceiveabilities.com/about/blog/the-history-of-surrogacy-abridged 
[https://perma.cc/3C3C-SPJY].  
14. Samantha Lollo, Note, Our Baby, Her Choices: The Need for Enforcement of Gestational 
Surrogate Contracts, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 180 (2018).  
15.  See discussion infra Section IV.   
16. Amanda Mechell Holliday, Comment, Who’s Your Daddy (And Mommy)? Creating 
Certainty for Texas Couples Entering into Surrogacy Contracts, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1101, 1102 
(2003).  
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the intended mother.17 Since the surrogate is the genetic and biological 
mother of the child, it comes as no surprise that issues arise when 
determining the parental rights of the intended mother, regardless of the 
surrogate’s intentions.18 Gestational surrogacies, on the other hand, are not 
as legally complex since the surrogate carries the child but has no genetic 
relationship to the child.19 In gestational surrogacy, an embryo is implanted 
in the surrogate through in-vitro fertilization.20 The embryo is typically 
either genetically related to both of the intended parents or to at least one, 
with the help of an egg or sperm donor.21 
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE FUNCTIONALIST THEORY 
Traditional functionalist theory is based largely on the works of Herbert 
Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton.22 
Functionalism is a sociological theory that all aspects of a society serve a 
function and are necessary for the survival of that society.23 This perspective 
emphasizes the interconnectedness of society by focusing on how each part 
 
 
17. Id.  
18. See In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014), a landmark Tennessee traditional surrogacy 
case where the Supreme Court refused to grant custody to the intended parents and terminate the parental 
rights of the surrogate. The court concluded that the surrogate retains parental rights unless and until 
such rights are terminated in a future proceeding. Id. at 812. The court declared that traditional surrogacy 
agreements are not prohibited against public policy of the state, but that certain restrictions apply. Id. at 
833. To exhibit the utter lack of consistency among the states, compare In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 807 
(holding that in a traditional surrogacy case the surrogate retains parental rights unless and until such 
rights are terminated in a future proceeding), with In re F.T.R., 349 Wis.2d 84 (2013) (holding that 
traditional surrogacy agreements were enforceable to the extent enforcement was not contrary to the 
child’s best interest, despite the traditional surrogate deciding that she no longer wanted to give up her 
parental rights). See also, Holliday, supra note 16, at 1102. 
19. Id. However, complexities do still exist in gestational surrogacy. In In re C.K.G., an 
unmarried couple in a long-term relationship decided to have children via In Vitro Fertilization using 
Charles’s sperm and an egg donor. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005). Cindy, the intended 
mother and surrogate, signed an agreement formalizing her intent to be the mother of any child born. 
However, after the children were born, the parents’ relationship deteriorated. Id. at 716. Charles objected 
to Cindy asserting her parental rights on the basis that she had no genetic relationship to the children so 
she could not be the legal mother. Id. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the Court of Appeals 
ruling that Cindy, the gestational mother, is the children’s legal mother. Id. at 717. The court adopted an 
intent test, where the gestational mother is deemed the legal mother if her intent was to raise the children 
and if there is no dispute about parental status between the gestational mother and the genetic mother. 
Id. 
20. See What is In Vitro Fertilization?, supra note 1.   
21. What is Gestational Surrogacy?, AMERICAN SURROGACY & SURROGATE.COM, 
https://surrogate.com/about-surrogacy/types-of-surrogacy/what-is-gestational-surrogacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/CZ36-YHCX] (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).  
22. Linda A. Mooney et al., The Three Main Sociological Perspectives, UNDERSTANDING 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 1 (2007) (e-book).  
23. Ashley Crossman, Understanding Functionalist Theory, THOUGHT CO. (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/functionalist-perspective-3026625 [https://perma.cc/2YDE-QFQE]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/8
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influences and is influenced by surrounding parts.24 Functionalism 
emphasizes “the consensus and order that exist in society, focusing on social 
stability and shared public values.”25 Functionalist theory focuses on 
uncovering how aspects of society function rather than why they function.26 
Functionalists view family, politics, and economics as the central elements 
in society.27 Functionalists theorists attempt to uncover how these sectors 
function independently in our society and how they interact with others to 
achieve stability.28 Family, politics, and economics must all depend on each 
other in order for society to function at its most productive capacity. A large 
portion of work on this theory focuses on the family element because of its 
importance in reproduction, among other functions.29  
Functionalists believe that the three sectors work in harmony to create 
stability. However, functionalists prefer static stability. They view societal 
change as undesirable because various parts of society will be required to 
compensate when problems arise.30 When disorganization and dysfunction 
occur in one sector, it affects all other sectors and creates societal 
problems.31 A social change must occur to mitigate this disequilibrium and 
can be achieved by adjusting various societal components.32 Once the 
system changes, society stabilizes.33 
Although a social change may be imperative, opponents of functionalist 
theory argue that people are discouraged from changing their social 
environment, even when doing so benefits them.34  For example, Emile 
Durkheim viewed crime as an element of society that embodies both 
functional and dysfunctional qualities. Crime is dysfunctional in that “it is 
 
 
24. Mooney et al., supra note 22.  
25. Crossman, supra note 23.  
26. Id. 
27. Id. Elements, sectors and components are used interchangeably throughout this Note.  
28. Id.  
29. Reading: Theoretical Perspectives on Sex, LUMEN LEARNING SOCIOLOGY, 
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/alamo-sociology/chapter/reading-theoretical-perspectives-on-sex/ 
[https://perma.cc/J7N5-DDH4] (last visited Jan. 4, 2019). See also Linda A. Mooney et al., supra note 
22 (discussing that politics and economics are also seen as important social elements because politics 
provides a mean of governing members of society, and economics provides the production, distribution, 
and consumption of goods and services).  
30. Crossman, supra note 23.  
31. See Mooney et al., supra note 22 (defining dysfunction as a disruption of social stability); 
see also Crossman, supra note 23 (defining disorganization as deviant behavior leading to change).  
32. Crossman, supra note 23. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. Another critique of functionalist theory is that it justifies the status quo and the process of 
cultural hegemony – a tacit agreement with the way that things are. Nicki Lisa Cole, Ph.D., What is 
Cultural Hegemony?, THOUGHT CO. (July 2, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/cultural-hegemony-
3026121 [https://perma.cc/85JL-W4GU]. 
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associated with physical violence, loss of property, and fear.”35 However, a 
limited amount of crime is also functional “because it leads to heightened 
awareness of shared moral bonds and increased social cohesion.”36 
Durkheim believed clarification and reinforcement of moral boundaries 
through crime and punishment actually strengthen society and are vital to 
society’s proper functioning.37 Functionalism’s discouragement of active 
social change additionally allows crime to continue to occur even when 
reducing crime would be substantially beneficial.38 Encouraging society to 
actively disengage from generating social change is a critique of this theory 
since it conflicts with the theory’s main principle of societal 
interconnectedness.39 
A. Functionalism and Surrogacy  
The family sector is an essential component of society, and while there 
is no universal definition of family,40 many definitions include children. 
When individuals or couples receive news of infertility, the image of an 
idealistic family vanishes. Disruption of procreation leaves the family 
sector, which relies on reproducing, nurturing and educating children,41 
unable to function at its highest capacity. However, third party reproduction, 
and specifically surrogacy, affords everyone—infertile couples, gay or 
lesbian couples, single men, or women who want a child without pregnancy 
– the opportunity to have a genetically related child. Unfortunately, 
traditional functionalist works, specifically the work of Talcott Parsons, are 
centered on outdated views regarding sex and procreation outside of 
marriage.42 Parsons argued that sexual activity, and thereafter procreation, 
should only occur within the sole confines of a stable, legally recognized 
relationship so that offspring had the best chance for appropriate 
socialization.43 A traditional functionalist belief furthermore “stress[ed] the 
importance of regulating sexual behavior to ensure marital cohesion and 
 
 
35. Mooney et al., supra note 22.  
36. Id.  
37. Scott A. Bonn, Ph.D. Serial Murder and Functionalism, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Oct. 20, 
2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/wicked-deeds/201910/serial-murder-and-
functionalism [https://perma.cc/75V4-ZUSG] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).  
38. See Crossman, supra note 23. 
39. See Mooney et al., supra note 22. 
40. “The word family may mean children, wife and children, blood relatives, or the members of 
the domestic circle, according to the connection in which the word is used.” Spencer v. Spencer, 11 
Paige Ch. 159, 160 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).  
41. Mooney et al., supra note 22. 
42. Theoretical Perspectives on Sex, supra note 29.  
43. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/8
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family stability.”44 In light of Parsons’s perspective, functionalist theory 
initially appears to reject surrogacy because surrogacy acts as an additional 
mechanism to enable procreation outside of marriage and weakens the 
idealistic image of marital cohesion.45 However, with broader acceptance 
today of what a modern family looks like, modern-day views of 
functionalism accept surrogacy as a method to enhance family stability and 
contribute to society’s functioning.  
Societal functionalism is enhanced by surrogacy in three important 
ways.  First, surrogacy protects family stability. In fact, a recent study 
suggests that the parent-child relationship is stronger in families with only 
one genetic parent than in natural-conception families. This result is likely 
due to the extra burdens experienced by these parents in their efforts to 
procreate.46 The strengthened relationship between children born through 
surrogacy and their parents could also be explained by the fact that, “couples 
[and individuals] who cannot reproduce without assistance would be 
unlikely to seek technologic help if they were not particularly enthusiastic 
about parenting.”47 Moreover, as single-parent and same-sex couple 
parenting become increasingly common, surrogacy allows these individuals 
to genetically procreate, advancing the modern concept of a family. The 
advancement of a modern family as single individuals and same-sex couples 
adds to family stability since it provides broader acceptance of what a family 
looks like. 48 
 Second, since functionalism places importance on procreation within 
the family sector, surrogacy serves an important function in society because 
it allows this sector to return to equilibrium after an infertility crisis. 
Infertility can be equated to Emile Durkheim’s view on crime.49 It causes a 
sense of loss and sadness; however, with the assistance of reproductive 
technology and surrogacy, infertility can also lead to shared moral bonds 
and societal cohesion between individuals and their surrogates. These 
 
 
44. Id.  
45. See id.for a discussion of Parson’s view on the importance of regulating sexual behavior 
within the marriage to ensure family stability.   
46. Clinton Wang, Health and Development of Children Conceived Through Assisted 
Reproduction, 16 AMA J. OF ETHICS 34, (2014), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/health-and-
development-children-conceived-through-assisted-reproduction/2014-01 [https://perma.cc/BX9U-
HVCG] (discussing Henry Bos & Frank Van Balen, Children of the New Reproductive Technologies: 
Social and Genetic Parenthood, 81 PATIENT EDUC. AND COUNSELING 429-35 (2010)).  
47. Wang, supra note 46.   
48. Being a single parent protects family stability since it gives that parent “increased bonding 
time with the children,” the “unique opportunity to role model strong, ethical behavior,” and creates a 
household without fighting between parents. Pros and Cons in Single Parent Families, UNIVERSAL 
CLASS, https://www.universalclass.com/articles/self-help/pros-and-cons-in-single-parent-families.htm  
[https://perma.cc/K2XE-F6VR] (last visited Jan. 5, 2019).  
49. Mooney et al., supra note 22, at 35-36.  
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women make a decision to help others who are infertile, but would like to 
have a genetically related child.50 Surrogacy can be considered a “social 
good,” and the act of carrying a child for another can strengthen the bonds 
between members of society in a deeply personal way.  
Third, surrogacy is supported by the functionalist belief that when 
interconnected parts cannot work together, alternate means should be 
adopted to restore society’s balance.51 Each part of society contributes to 
the stability of society as a whole, so when one element is not functioning 
at its highest efficiency, the whole society suffers. Infertility precludes the 
family sector from functioning at its highest efficiency since functionalist 
theory places a high emphasis on procreation.52 Society began to utilize 
alternate means for reproduction as one remedy to ensure that procreation 
was still possible.53 A contemporary perspective of functionalism indicates 
that surrogacy is accepted, despite Parsons’ underlying, and now dated, 
concerns of enabling procreation outside of marriage.54  
However, the law lags far behind society’s increasing use of surrogacy. 
Family law is one area of law that is traditionally reserved to the states.55 
This explains the lack of consistency in surrogacy laws throughout the 
United States.56 Most states have chosen to stay silent on this topic, and in 
these states, judges have the legal discretion to deny parents of their legal 
rights based on their own moral or ethical biases. This silence can cause 
surrogacy cases to be inconsistently decided,57 leaving the family sector 
disorganized and dysfunctional. Dysfunction typically occurs when a 
gestational surrogate asserts parental rights as the child’s mother.58 Families 
may be left disheartened and without a predictable remedy of law (or legal 
rights to their child), especially in states where determining parentage in 
third-party reproduction is a matter of first impression.59 Since surrogacy is 
accepted under functionalism, different sectors of society must work 
together to remedy the current disorganization and dysfunction in the family 
sector. 
 
 
50. See The History of Surrogacy, Abridged, supra note 13.  
51. Crossman, supra note 23. 
52. See Crossman, supra note 23; Mooney et al., supra note 22.  
53. See The History of Surrogacy, Abridged, supra note 13. 
54. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45 detailing Parson’s perspective on the sanctity of 
marriage.    
55. “Federalism in family law was intended to check the emergence of national tyranny over 
family life.” Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 221, 226 (2005).  
56. See discussion infra Section IV.   
57. See discussion infra Section IV.   
58. Unif. Parentage Act, supra note 5.   
59. See discussion infra Section IV.   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/8
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III. COMPENSATED GESTATIONAL SURROGACY AGREEMENTS 
The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that its obligation is to define 
the liberty of all, not to mandate a moral code.60 However, in the absence of 
a Supreme Court ruling on surrogacy legislation, critics like state 
legislatures61 and select feminist family-law scholars62 continue to condemn 
commercial surrogacy for its perceived immorality. These opponents focus 
on surrogacy agreements that compensate the surrogate.63 Critics raise two 
major public policy arguments in opposition to compensated surrogacy. 
Both arguments are misguided. 
First, critics fear that surrogacy will give men another way to exploit 
women because of their reproductive capability.64 However, contract 
principles support compensated surrogacy. In defending freedom of 
contract principles, Professor Richard Epstein, a proponent of surrogacy, 
argued that “full control over their own bodies and labor is what 
autonomous individuals have before they contract. The process of 
contracting always requires a surrender of some portion of autonomy, but 
only in exchange for things that are thought to be more valuable.”65 
Surrogates freely consent to restrictions of their personal freedom as a 
statement of their strong desire to carry a child for the intended parents.66 
Therefore, compensated surrogacy is not exploitative.   
 
 
60. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).  
61. See Michigan Surrogate Parenting Act, M.C.L. §§ 722. 851-863; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 121 
et seq. (McKinney 2020). 
62. Andrea Dworkin, a radical feminist, argued that surrogacy is analogous to prostitution since 
it puts a price on women’s bodies—something that is not typical of the way society views men’s bodies. 
Jennifer S. White, Note, Gestational Surrogacy Contracts in Tennessee: Freedom of Contract Concerns 
& Feminist Principles in the Balance, 2 BELMONT L. REV. 269, 281 (2015), see ANDREA DWORKIN, 
RIGHT-WING WOMEN 182 (1983); see also White, at 290-91, citing Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate 
Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 167, 
172 (Lawrence O. Gostin ed., 1990), for an additional argument suggesting that other feminists who 
oppose surrogacy believe that the decision to relinquish custody of a child is never truly voluntary 
because of unpredictable hormonal changes. However, Andrews notes that a change of heart or 
unpredictable hormone changes would not allow a party to disregard his or her contractual obligations 
in any other contract. “Feminist proponents of surrogacy respond to anti-surrogacy feminists by arguing 
that failure to enforce surrogacy contracts based on this rationale suggests that by virtue of being born 
female, a woman cannot truly consent to certain contracts.” White, at 291.  
63. See White, supra note 62, at 295, for a discussion on why payment may be necessary to a 
functioning surrogacy system.  
64. Margaret Friedlander Brinig, Comment, A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment 
on Richard Epstein’s Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2377, 
2380 (1995); see also White, supra note 62, at 290.  
65. Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 
2305, 2335 (1995).  
66. Interview with Tim Schlesinger, Assisted Reprod. Tech. Partner, Paule, Camazine, & 
Blumenthal, in St. Louis, Mo. (Aug. 31, 2018). 
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Second, critics believe that compensation is given in exchange for a 
human being and thus equates surrogacy to “baby selling.”67 Contrary to the 
beliefs of surrogacy opponents, surrogacy should not be equated to “baby 
selling” because a surrogate is not being compensated for giving the 
intended parents a baby.68 Surrogates still receive the full amount due based 
on the length of the pregnancy regardless of the child’s health, or even 
whether the pregnancy results in a stillbirth.69 This is further evidence that 
surrogates are compensated for providing the service of carrying the baby, 
not “selling” the baby.  
Another viewpoint, espoused in a student Note by Jennifer White, is 
that “paying a surrogate for her services should be viewed as similar to 
paying a reproductive center for artificial insemination or other fertility 
treatments that are commonly used to assist couples in conceiving a child.”70  
In terms of freedom to contract, the law treats sperm donation much 
differently than gestational surrogacy. Sperm donors contract to relinquish 
all legal rights to any genetically related child that may be conceived using 
their sperm.71 Unlike sperm donors, gestational surrogates have no genetic 
relationship to the child72 yet still contract to relinquish the same legal rights 
to any child conceived through surrogacy. However, because of the Uniform 
Parentage Act presumption,73 in states without surrogacy laws, a gestational 
surrogate can petition the court for legal rights to a child that is not 
genetically theirs. Sperm donors presumably cannot go to court and do the 
same. If sperm donation is not equated to a sale, gestational surrogacy 
should not be either because the baby was never the surrogate’s child.74 
Logically, the fees should be considered a payment for services and not a 
payment for a child.  
A. Functionalism and Compensated Surrogacy Agreements 
 
 
67. White, supra note 62, at 288-89. The Oregon state legislature has carved out a surrogacy 
exception under trafficking law, implying that surrogacy is inherently different. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
163.537 (West). 
68. The gestational carrier is entering into this agreement based on her free will and is being 
compensated for the services rendered, her risk, discomfort endured, time, effort, and relinquishment of 
certain behaviors, not for any genetic material. Compensated surrogacy agreements clearly state that no 
money is being exchanged in return for the “sale” of a child. Interview with Tim Schlesinger, Assisted 
Reprod. Tech. Partner, Paule, Camazine, & Blumenthal, in St. Louis, Mo. (Aug. 31, 2018).  
69. Interview with Tim Schlesinger, Assisted Reprod. Tech. Partner, Paule, Camazine, & 
Blumenthal, in St. Louis, MO. (Feb. 25, 2020). 
70. White, supra note 62, at 295.  
71. Id. at 288-89.   
72. Holliday, supra note 16, at 1102-03. 
73. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, supra note 5.  
74. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (defining gestational surrogacy).  
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 Since procreation is a function of the family sector, functionalists 
support and encourage the practice of compensated surrogacy agreements.75 
Compensation may encourage some women who have been considering 
becoming a surrogate to actively seek out an agency. Allowing compensated 
surrogacy agreements increases the pool of available potential surrogates—
enabling the family sector to function more efficiently. Because surrogacy 
is becoming an increasingly prevalent method of procreation, a ban on 
compensated agreements would only push the family sector into further 
imbalance. Without compensation, women may be less likely to become 
surrogates, which would somewhat eliminate one available method of 
reproduction.   
Additionally, because both the intended parents and the surrogate 
benefit from the agreement, compensated surrogacy maintains the balance 
in society between the parties. The surrogate performs a service for the 
intended parents, and the intended parents receive genetically related 
offspring. Legal scholar Richard Posner espouses that an economic 
efficiency argument76 maintains the balance because “the parties would not 
make [an agreement] if they did not think it would make both of them better 
off.”77 Posner argues that individuals should have the autonomy to contract 
efficiently for their personal benefit.78  Therefore, by allowing individuals 
to contract for their personal benefit, compensated surrogacy agreements 
preserve the status quo.  
IV. BREACH OF CONTRACT REMEDIES 
 Third-party reproduction is the only opportunity for individuals and 
same-sex couples to have equitable access to genetic family formation.79 
Intended parents who wish to form a family using a surrogate invest a 
 
 
75. Theoretical Perspectives on Sex, supra note 29.  
76. Posner defines “efficiency” as “exploiting economic resources in such a way that human 
satisfaction as measured by aggregated consumer willingness to pay for goods or services is maximized.” 
Donald H.J. Hermann, Comment, Review of “Economic Analysis of Law,” by Richard A. Posner, 1974 
WASH. U. L. Q. 354, n.4 (1974).   
77. Richard A. Posner, Comment, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 
59, 60 (1987).   
78. White, supra note 62, at 293.  
79. Id. at 271-72. A single male or female may prefer to raise a child alone, and many infertile 
couples see surrogacy as an alternative to adoption. This is unequivocally true for infertile heterosexual 
couples, but these couples typically turn to surrogacy after they have exhausted other reproductive 
options. Id.   
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significant amount of time,80 money (even when uncompensated),81 and 
emotional labor into the process.82 Intended parents hope they can rely on 
their surrogate to fulfill her contractual promises, but there are always risks 
associated with these agreements. The intended parents and surrogate may 
disagree on whether to terminate the pregnancy or selectively abort a fetus.83 
Selection reduction lowers the number of fetuses through a surgery called 
multifetal reduction. The goal of selective reduction is to improve a 
woman’s chances for a healthy pregnancy.84  The main purpose of a 
surrogacy contract is “[t]o make sure that, should a decision about a 
termination arise, everyone is making the decision with full 
 
 
80. For some couples, the decision to use a surrogate is one that takes time to process and accept. 
Once an individual or couple is ready to conceive using a surrogate, there is a standard procedure that 
can take upwards of two years. The intended parents must find a surrogate, the surrogate must be 
medically cleared, the parties must retain an attorney to draft a legal agreement, the embryos must be 
transferred and may not result in a successful pregnancy on the first attempt, and then the intended 
parents must wait out the nine month pregnancy period. However, then once the child is born, the 
attorney must obtain a judge’s signature on the judgment of parentage to a judge and contact the state’s 
Department of Health to obtain a new birth certificate. Kelly Enders-Tharp, A Rough Timeline for 
Intended Parents, GROWING GENERATIONS (Jan. 22, 2015), 
https://www.growinggenerations.com/surrogacy-resources-for-intended-parents/a-rough-timeline-for-
intended-parents/ [ https://perma.cc/PBZ9-F7ER]. 
81. Even where the surrogate is not being compensated, the intended parents typically reimburse 
the surrogate for out- of- pocket expenses incurred as the result of her participation in the agreement, 
including (but not limited to) health insurance, medical expenses, and legal fees. Interview with Tim 
Schlesinger, Assisted Reprod. Tech. Partner, Paule, Camazine, & Blumenthal, in St. Louis, Mo. (Aug. 
31, 2018). 
82. Intended parents must take the leap of faith and entrust another person to take care of 
something extremely important to them. It is often an emotional task for the intended parents to let go 
their control of the pregnancy, yet stay closely involved. Dr. Carrie Eichberg Ph.D., Frequently Asked 
Questions About the Emotional Aspects of Surrogacy, PARENTS VIA EGG DONATION, 
https://www.pved.org/surrogacy-faq-emotionalaspects.php [https://perma.cc/M9Y6-H8XV]. 
83. See DEBORAH L. FORMAN, Abortion and Selective Reduction Clauses in Surrogacy 
Contracts: What Every Intended Parent and Surrogate Needs to Know, PATH 2 PARENTHOOD (Nov. 24, 
2014), http://www.path2parenthood.org/blog/abortion-and-selective-reduction-clauses-in-surrogacy-
contracts-what-every-intended-parent-and-surrogate-needs-to-know [https://perma.cc/Y27R-6ZCE] 
(discussing ways to minimize the risk of conflict between intended parents and surrogates given that 
courts will not order a surrogate to undergo selective reduction against her will). See also Cook v. 
Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 928-29 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (illustrating the conflict between a gestational 
surrogate and intended father where the surrogate cited her anti-abortion beliefs and refused to 
selectively reduce, despite having signed the contract agreeing to abide by the agreement’s selective 
reduction clause).  
84. A fetus is “an unborn offspring from the embryo stage (the end of the eighth week after 
conception…) until birth.” Medical Definition of Fetus, MEDICINENET (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=3424 [https://perma.cc/T8W9-GUFN]. 
The more fetuses in the womb, the more likely the woman is to have a miscarriage or a stillborn. What 
is Multifetal Reduction? WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-reproduction/fertility-
multifetal-reduction#1 [https://perma.cc/L7D6-STTD]. Selective reduction also lowers the chance of the 
baby being born too early. Premature delivery can cause lifelong health issues of the lungs, heart, 
stomach, and brain. Finally, selective reduction lowers the chance that the surrogate experiences severe 
morning sickness, diabetes, preeclampsia, anemia, and placental abruption. Id. 
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understanding.”85 Unsurprisingly, conflicts can, and do, arise when the 
surrogate makes medical decisions, such as having or refusing to have an 
abortion, contrary to the intended parents’ wishes. Since it is a clear 
constitutional violation of privacy and personal liberty for a court to 
mandate an abortion,86 selection reduction87 and termination of pregnancy 
clauses are two contractual clauses that, if breached, cannot be remedied 
with specific performance (court ordered performance of a contractual 
duty).88 If specific performance is unavailable, intended parents are left with 
minimal available remedies.89 Even if a court were to award the intended 
parents monetary value in damages, the remedies available do not provide 
the intended parents with what they are seeking: a baby.  
Selective reduction and termination of pregnancy are already divisive, 
sensitive topics. Contract clauses on selective reduction and abortion 
exacerbate criticism that compensated surrogacy agreements are immoral.90 
Though, there are advocates who believe that a surrogate should be held to 
her earlier commitment at the time of contracting as it relates to these 
clauses. These individuals believe specific performance would apply even 
when the surrogate experiences intervening distress during pregnancy and 
 
 
85. KATIE O’REILLY, When Parents and Surrogates Disagree on Abortion, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 
18, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/02/surrogacy-contract-melissa-
cook/463323 [https://perma.cc/SMS6-EPSV] (quoting Jes Stumpf, executive director of the Vermont 
Surrogacy Network). 
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a pregnant woman has a constitutional right 
to terminate a pregnancy prior to the point of viability under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).   
87. In 2016, a case arose in California after Melissa Cook, a gestational surrogate, refused to 
selectively reduce a high-risk triplet pregnancy after the intended father asked three times. Cook v. 
Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2016). The intended father was concerned about his 
finances and the three fetuses’ health. The three babies were born premature (at 28 weeks gestation) and 
remained in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit for seven weeks. Id. The court was not involved until 
Melissa Cook filed an action in federal court seeking to overturn California’s surrogacy law and name 
her as the mother of the children. The court was obligated to dismiss the claim because it would interfere 
with ongoing state court proceedings. Id. at 938. Still, this case illustrates the limited recourse an 
intended parent has when a gestational surrogate refuses to undergo a selective reduction procedure.  
88. LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Specific Performance, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/specific_performance [https://perma.cc/VQ5E-Q5NM].  
89. A court can order the surrogate to pay the intended parents “compensatory, expectancy, 
restitution, reliance, punitive, or mental pain and anguish damages.” Lollo, supra note 14, at 182.  While 
the court has the authority to award these types of damages, because of the speculative nature of the 
injury, it is more likely that intended parents will be awarded restitution and reliance damages. Id. at 
182-83.  
90. In states where surrogacy contracts are considered void against public policy, no aspect of 
the contract would be enforceable. Forman, supra note 83; see also discussion infra section V on state 
enforceability of surrogacy agreements.  
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ultimately changes her mind.91 The tort law principle of voluntary 
undertaking could support their argument. Under a voluntary undertaking,  
an actor who undertakes to render services to another and who knows 
or should know that the services will reduce the risk of physical harm 
to the other has the duty of reasonable care to the other in conducting 
the undertaking if: … (b) the person to whom the services are 
rendered or another relies on the actor’s exercising reasonable care in 
the undertaking.92   
Applied to surrogacy, once a surrogate intervenes and makes the decision 
to carry the child for the intended parents, she must exercise due care and 
cannot leave the intended parents in a worse position later than they 
previously enjoyed by terminating the pregnancy against their consent.93  
Further, while Roe v. Wade delineates that procreative rights are strictly 
confined to the individual,94 surrogates knowingly, willingly, and 
intelligently consent to waive this constitutional right within the contract.95 
Proponents of court enforcement view a waiver of reproductive rights 
similarly to the common waiver of First Amendment rights.96 Consequently, 
the surrogate’s advanced agreement to a procreative decision should be 
upheld under a voluntary undertaking principle.  
Those who oppose court enforcement of selective reduction and 
termination of pregnancy clauses predominantly raise concerns about forced 
 
 
91. Julia Dalzell, Note, The Enforcement of Selective Reduction Clauses in Surrogacy Contracts, 
27 WIDCLR 83, 104  (2018) (inferring that “[w]ith a clear legal rule that selective reduction clauses are 
enforceable, any woman with doubts about her psychological stability will steer away from contracting 
altogether, avoiding the problem of later regret”).    
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 42 (AM. LAW. INST. 2010).  
93. Some scholars additionally believe that under tort law, the contractual relationship between 
the surrogate and the intended parents and child creates a “special relationship.” Dalzell, supra note 91, 
at 113. “In essence, the carrier is the trustee, and the fetus, as a beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship 
between the intended parents and the carrier, depends upon the carrier to act in good faith by fulfilling 
her duties of loyalty and care.” Id. (quoting  
Kevin Yamamoto & Shelby A.D. Moore, A Trust Analysis of a Gestational Carrier's Right to Abortion, 
70 FORDHAM  L. REV. 93 165 (2001)). 
94. Roe, 410 U.S. 113 at 153-54 (1973); see, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976); Forman, supra note 83 (reinforcing the notion that the decision to 
terminate a pregnancy rests with the pregnant woman – consequently the surrogate, not the intended 
parents); cf. Dalzell supra note 91, at 103, arguing against the opposing position that women do not have 
“decisional maturity based on their supposed hormonally-induced unpredictability” because it “depict[s] 
a strong sense of paternalism” and “presumes that women are naïve, unable to evaluate information from 
their health care providers, and psychologically unfit to make rationale [sic] choices.”  
95. Lollo, supra note 14, at 186 (stating that a surrogate reviews the contract with her attorney 
so she can adequately understand what she is signing).  
96. Reproductive rights involve the same deeply personal issues unique to the individual as First 
Amendment rights. Dalzell, supra note 91, at 95.  
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consent.97 Since a court cannot mandate an unwanted abortion,98 and a 
surrogate’s emotional response to pregnancy cannot be controlled or 
legislated,99 this issue will persist. Federal surrogacy legislation would still 
serve a beneficial purpose despite not being able to address these 
controversial clauses. Legislation would mitigate other legal issues like 
establishing legal parentage,100 making the surrogacy process slightly less 
speculative and stressful for both parties.  
A surrogate could additionally breach the contract by engaging in risky 
behavior that harms the fetus. Prior to signing the contract, the surrogate is 
fully aware that she will have to relinquish certain liberties during the 
pregnancy.101 By engaging in behavior prohibited by a “behavioral terms” 
provision, the surrogate breaches the contract. In terms of enforcement, 
intended parents are limited in remedies since it is an invasion of privacy to 
micromanage the surrogate, and the parents may not even be aware of the 
damaging behavior until much later.102  
One remedy, monetary damages, is available if the surrogate 
substantially engages in prohibited behavior.103 Theoretically, if the 
surrogate substantially deviated from the allowed behavior and the child is 
born with birth defects or ongoing detrimental health conditions, then 
contract law allows the intended parents to sue the surrogate for monetary 
damages.104 Monetary damages act as partial compensation for tangible 
loss, but courts will rarely award money if the damages are too 
speculative.105 For instance, some health or cognitive consequences may 
remain unrealized for months or years post-partum and, therefore, be 
 
 
97. Id. at 102.  
98. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54 (1973).   
99. See also FORMAN, supra note 83 (discussing the implausibility of court enforcement of 
selective reduction and termination of pregnancy clauses).  
100. See supra notes 5, 8 and accompanying text (explaining legal parentage).  
101. Interview with Tim Schlesinger, Assisted Reprod. Tech. Partner, Paule, Camazine, & 
Blumenthal, in St. Louis, Mo. (Aug. 31, 2018) (discussing the relinquishment of certain liberties 
including: abstaining from consuming raw fish, avoiding contact with cat litter, using hair dye within 
the first trimester, drinking alcohol, using tobacco or illicit drugs, engaging in high risk sexual 
intercourse for an extended period of time, and traveling to jurisdictions with known cases of the Zika 
virus, among others).  
102. Interview with Tim Schlesinger, Assisted Reprod. Tech. Partner, Paule, Camazine, & 
Blumenthal, in St. Louis, Mo. (Aug. 31, 2018) (discussing the unreasonableness in true enforcement of 
these behaviors, including ensuring that the surrogate refrains from feeding stray cats because of a fear 
of Toxoplasmosis).  
103. Cf. Lollo, supra note 14, at 182 (stating that damages are typically the remedy courts award 
when an abortion or reduction provision is breached).  
104. Cf. Lollo, supra note 14, at 182 (“[A]ssuming the surrogate contract is valid and enforceable, 
when the contract is breached…the court can order the surrogate to pay the intended parents damages . 
. .”).   
105.  Lollo, supra note 14, at 182.  
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unaccounted for during the judicial process. For tangible loss, monetary 
damages may be recoverable under basic contract law even if the surrogate 
agreement is executed in a state that does not have surrogacy laws.106 
Though, in states where surrogacy agreements are void as against public 
policy, intended parents are left with absolutely no breach of contract 
remedy.107   
Judges should have the authority to enforce the contract in some 
capacity regardless of the perceived immorality of surrogacy. Both intended 
parents and gestational carriers benefit from knowing that their rights and 
remedies at the time of contracting would be upheld if a breach occurred. 
Otherwise, the risk of entering into an agreement of this nature may be too 
high to be justified.   
A. Functionalism and Breach of Contract Remedies 
Functionalism’s main goal of achieving societal harmony is analogous 
to contract law’s purpose of awarding monetary damages to make the 
injured party whole.108 Because of these similar principles, functionalism 
supports a court award of compensatory and restitution monetary 
damages109 for a breach of “behavioral terms.” It is therefore plausible that 
functionalism would also support a specific performance remedy. The 
parties to a surrogate agreement have a special relationship due to the deeply 
personal purpose for the contract, and a breach by the surrogate causes a 
serious deterioration of trust. Specific performance returns the injured party 
to a state of equilibrium in a way that a monetary award cannot.110  Since 
forum shopping and reproductive tourism111 allows intended parents and 
surrogates to be matched across the nation, a deterioration of trust in the 
aggregate can cause serious harm to the reproductive subset of the family 
sector.  
In actuality, functionalist theory does not support specific performance 
for a breach of an abortion provision because the constitutional disharmony 
in doing so outweighs the perceived benefit. It is a fundamental 
 
 
106. Cf. Lollo, supra note 14, at 182 (“assuming the surrogate contract is valid and enforceable, 
when the contract is breached…the court can order the surrogate to pay the intended parents damages . 
. .”); contra FORMAN, supra note 83 (stating that in states where surrogacy contracts are considered void 
against public policy, no aspect of the contract will be enforceable).  
107. FORMAN, supra note 83.   
108. Lollo, supra note 14, at 182.  
109. Id. (defining compensatory damages as an award for the actual loss the intended parents 
suffered, based on proven harm, loss, or injury, and defining restitution damages as a return or 
reimbursement of the expenses paid to the surrogate as of the date of the breach).  
110. See Specific Performance, supra note 88.  
111. Ikemoto, supra note 12, at 281.   
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constitutional principle that a woman has an absolute right to make 
decisions regarding her medical care.112 If society were able to supersede 
fundamental constitutional protections, tremendous social dysfunction 
would result. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely under the current state of 
the law that functionalism would support a judicial mandate of an unwanted 
abortion, or conversely, a refrain from terminating.  
In addition, specific performance is not supported under functionalism 
as a practical remedy for a surrogate’s breach of “behavioral terms.” If 
surrogates believed they were under constant scrutiny by the intended 
parents (or the court), fewer women may offer to become a surrogate. 
Individuals and couples would have no other choice but to turn to foster care 
or adoption as a means to parent. Although adoption and foster care 
themselves do not lead to societal instability, the family sector would 
weaken as a result of the elimination of an entire means of reproduction.  
However, if a surrogate were to significantly engage in prohibited 
behavior, functionalist theory would allow monetary damages as an 
adequate remedy. Damages protect social stability since surrogates would 
likely be discouraged from engaging in risk-adverse behavior–such as 
drinking alcohol or smoking cigarettes113–that would harm the fetus. While 
functionalism would support monetary damage, it is important to note that 
damages for risky behavior attempts to assign a monetary value to the life 
of an unborn fetus. Though, it is likely that this concern can be reconciled 
under the functionalist view that some aspects of society can serve as both 
functional and dysfunctional.114  
A court awarding monetary damages to an injured party is analogous to 
Durkheim’s view on crime since it acts as both necessary and damaging to 
societal stability.115 On one hand, monetary damages act as a mechanism to 
maintain equilibrium because they discourage breaches from occurring in 
the first place. If a breach does occur, monetary damages protect the injured 
party and safeguard the parties’ contractual obligations.116 On the other 
hand, monetary damages attempt to quantify the value of future quality of 
 
 
112. See e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 484-86 (1965) (holding that choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, 
and childrearing are protected by the Constitution and constitute a separate sphere in which the federal 
government cannot enter).  
113. “Drug researchers are discovering more and more about persistent learning and emotional 
disabilities, as well as physical defects and health problems, attributable to alcohol and other drug 
exposure during fetal development.” PADDY S. COOK, ET. AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERV., Alcohol, Tobacco, and Other Drugs May Harm the Unborn 1 (Tineke B. Haase ed., 1990).    
114. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text for a discussion on Emile Durkheim’s view 
on crime as both functional and dysfunctional.  
115. Mooney et al., supra note 22, at 8.  
116. See Lollo, supra note 14, at 182, for a discussion on the purpose of awarding damages.  
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life. Since each situation is unique, this leaves open the very real possibility 
for discrimination and abuse of power by judges. Nonetheless, monetary 
damages should continue to be an appropriate substitute remedy for specific 
performance just as crime continues to occur under functionalism.117  
V. STATE ANALYSIS OF GESTATIONAL SURROGACY LAWS 
Since surrogacy remains unregulated at the federal level,118 the state of 
the law is left to state legislatures.119 These legislators hold the decision 
making power over whether their particular state will be surrogacy-friendly, 
surrogacy-hostile, or somewhere in between.120 States that are surrogacy-
friendly have either enacted a clear statute permitting surrogacy, have a long 
history of judges upholding surrogacy contracts, or a combination of 
both.121 States that are surrogacy-hostile view all surrogate agreements 
(uncompensated and compensated) as void and unenforceable due to public 
policy concerns.122 In the most extreme of cases, individuals may be 
prosecuted for engaging in the surrogacy process in these states.123 States 
that are “somewhere in between” do not have surrogacy laws that address 
and regulate the agreements, and have either have had no surrogacy cases, 
or cases where the court has only enforced select terms.124 These states have 
resorted to a legal process that is both confusing and complicated, which 
allows judges to vary widely in their treatment of surrogacy contracts.125 
Surrogacy in these states is “largely a process that depends upon the 
integrity of intended parents and surrogates”126 rather than the legislature or 
judicial system. 
Illinois has taken a consistent position on the enforcement of surrogacy 
by enacting an elaborate and clear statute.127 This statute governs the 
surrogate process from contract formation to the issuance of birth 
 
 
117. Dalzell, supra note 91, at 106.  
118. Lollo, supra note 14, at 180.  
119. See supra note 55 and accompanying text .   
120. Surrogacy Laws by State, AMERICAN SURROGACY & SURROGATE.COM, 
https://surrogate.com/intended-parents/surrogacy-laws-and-legal-information/establishing-parentage-
in-surrogacy  [https://perma.cc/Q4E2-XGF2]. 
121. Id.   
122. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 722. 851-.863 (West 2018); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 121 et 
seq. (McKinney 2020) infra notes 152-56.   
123. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 121 et seq. (McKinney 2020) infra notes 152-53.  
124. Infra text accompanying notes 149-56   
125. Infra text accompanying notes 149-56.   
126. Nebraska Surrogacy Laws and Information, AMERICAN SURROGACY & SURROGATE.COM 
https://www.americansurrogacy.com/surrogacy/nebraska-surrogacy-laws [https://perma.cc/WG8K-
WJX].  
127. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35 (West 2018). 
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certificates without requiring any appearance in court.128 It applies to single 
parents who have furnished their own gametes or couples where at least one 
person has furnished his or her own gametes.129 In addition, California 
courts have used the California Family Code,130  California Uniform 
Parentage Act,131 and well-established case law132 to interpret a number of 
surrogate cases. California attracts a large number of reproductive tourists133  
because of the ability of courts to establish the legal parentage rights of the 
intended parents in a pre-birth parentage order.134 In 2017, Washington D.C. 
became surrogacy-friendly, with the District removing the ban on 
compensated surrogacy that dated back to the 1980’s.135 More recently, in 
May 2018, the New Jersey Governor signed the New Jersey Gestational 
Carrier Agreement Act into law.136 This Act declares that “gestational 
carrier agreements executed pursuant to this act are in accord with the public 
policy of the state,”137 securing both the rights and responsibilities of 
intended parents and surrogates. This legislation is especially monumental 
since it effectively supersedes the famous New Jersey Supreme Court 
decision, In Matter of Baby M,138 which prompted the enactment of the strict 
anti-surrogacy laws thirty years ago. 
 
 
128. Id.  
129. Id.  
130. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7960-7962 (West 2019). 
131. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7606 (West 2019). California courts have additionally held that 
though the Uniform Parentage Act, two women can be deemed as the legal parents of a child born via 
surrogacy.  
132. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 777-78 (Cal. 1993) (holding that “[w]hen, 
pursuant to a surrogacy agreement, a zygote formed of the gametes of a husband and wife is implanted 
in the uterus of another woman… the husband and wife are the child’s natural parents”); In re Marriage 
of Buzzanca, 61 Cal.App.4th 1410 (1998) (holding that the intended parents’ agreement with a surrogate 
for her to carry an embryo genetically unrelated to either of them on their behalf, deemed them both the 
lawful parents of the child born from that embryo).  
133. Ikemoto, supra note 12, at 281.  
134. What Are the State Laws in California for Surrogacy?, MODERN FAMILY SURROGACY 
CENTER, http://www.modernfamilysurrogacy.com/what-are-the-state-laws-in-california-for-surrogacy 
[https://perma.cc/A33C-C8F2]. 
135. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-401, 403-412 (West 2018).  
136. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-60 to -68 (West 2018).  
137. Id. § 9:17-61.  
138. In Matter of Baby M was the first American court ruling on the validity of surrogacy. In 
Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396 (1988), invalidated by N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-60 to -68 (West 2018). 
In In Matter of Baby M, William and Mrs. Stern entered into a traditional surrogacy agreement with the 
surrogate, Mary Beth Whitehead. The contract stated that Mary Beth would be artificially inseminated 
with William’s sperm, carry the child to term, and that when the baby was born, she would do everything 
necessary to terminate her parental rights so that Mrs. Stern could adopt the child. Id. at 411-12. 
However, after the birth of the child, Mary Beth decided that she did not want to give the baby back and 
she challenged the enforcement of the agreement. Id. at 415-16. Mary Beth claimed the contract was 
invalid and that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights. Id. at 417, 419. The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey ultimately reversed the trial court and declared that surrogacy contracts were invalid 
as against public policy. The court reinstated the surrogate’s parental rights. Id. at 459.  
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Although state legislation may favor surrogacy, it may still contain 
limitations or ambiguity on the parties’ legal rights. For example, the North 
Dakota legislature has authorized that a child born to a gestational carrier is 
a child of the intended parents,139 but sets the limitation that traditional 
surrogacy agreements are void—meaning the surrogate or her husband (if 
applicable) cannot be the genetic parents.140 Moreover, Arkansas’s 
favorable surrogacy law contains no language to indicate whether 
compensated surrogacy is permitted.141  
Although Louisiana enacted the Louisiana Surrogacy Bill in 2016 
permitting gestational surrogacy, 142 it is arguably the most controversial and 
discriminatory surrogacy legislation to date. The Louisiana bill includes 
clauses that extend surrogacy only to those using their own egg and sperm 
by defining “intended parents” as “a married couple who each exclusively 
contribute their own gametes to create their embryo.” 143 This is a 
requirement same-sex couples simply cannot meet. The inclusion of this 
restrictive statutory language solely provides Louisiana’s legislature a back-
door entry at foreclosing surrogacy for gay couples without apparent 
discrimination. Louisiana’s statute additionally excludes a large percentage 
of individuals, either single or with a partner, who wish to procreate using 
his or her genetic material and require a donor’s contribution.144 The 
punishments for entering into a surrogacy agreement that is not sanctioned 
by the new law include civil and criminal penalties.145 This bill excludes 
classes of individuals, and thus it will be susceptible to challenges under the 
Equal Protection Clause.146 
A state can still be surrogacy-friendly even it is does not have an 
elaborate statute defining the enforceability of surrogacy contracts and the 
rights of the parties. By way of example, Iowa and Kansas are states 
relatively favorable to surrogacy even in the absence of a statute. The Iowa 
Code exempts a “surrogate mother arrangement” from criminal provisions 
regarding the sale or purchase of human beings.147 In Kansas, pre-birth 
 
 
139. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-08 (West 2017) 
140. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05; Holliday, supra note 16 (defining traditional surrogacy).   
141. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (West 2018).   
142. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2718 - 9:2720.15 (2018).  
143. LA. STAT. ANN. § 2718.1(6).   
144. LA. STAT. ANN. § 2718.1(6).   
145. Amy Kern & Noel Vargas Jr., Gestational Surrogacy in Louisiana, CREATIVE FAMILY 
CONNECTIONS (2016), https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-map/louisiana/  
[https://perma.cc/FE34-KCXN]. 
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.   
147. U.S. Surrogacy Law by State, THE SURROGACY EXPERIENCE, 
https://www.thesurrogacyexperience.com/u-s-surrogacy-law-by-state.html [https://perma.cc/3MSJ-
ZR34]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
2020] MY GENETIC CHILD MAY NOT BE MY LEGAL CHILD? 315 
 
 
 
orders are regularly granted, even in the absence of a statute directive, if 
parent(s) are using their own egg and sperm.148  
However, there are states that remain strongly opposed to surrogacy, 
likely because of the beliefs that women are being exploited for their 
reproductive capabilities149 and that surrogacy is “baby selling.”150 New 
York and Michigan have particularly strict legislation to restrict who may 
procreate using third party reproduction.151 In New York, anyone who enters 
into a surrogacy agreement, regardless of whether it is compensated or 
uncompensated, may be fined up to $10,000.152 The lawyers and agencies 
that facilitate these agreements will be fined and could be found guilty of a 
felony.153 Michigan has gone so far as to enact the Michigan Surrogate 
Parenting Act.154 This Act declares all surrogacy contracts “void and 
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”155 Anyone who enters into a 
compensated surrogacy agreement in Michigan is subject to criminal 
penalties of up to $50,000.156  In order to avoid facing criminal charges, 
individuals and couples living and seeking surrogacy in these states are 
burdened with travelling an unknown distance in search of a more 
hospitable jurisdiction.   
 Finally, many of the states in the country are “somewhere in between” 
– they have no laws addressing or regulating surrogacy and thus, have not 
taken a consistent position regarding enforceability of surrogacy 
 
 
148. Id.  
149. See discussion supra section III.  
150. See id.  
151. THE AM. SOC’Y REPROD. MED., supra note 6 (defining Third Party Reproduction). The 
Indiana legislature additionally has particularly strict legislation and has declared that it is against public 
policy to enforce any term of a surrogate agreement that requires a surrogate to provide a gamete, consent 
to undergo an abortion, and engage in activity only in accordance with the demands of another person, 
among others. IND. CODE31-20-1-1 (2018).  
152. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 121 et seq. (McKinney 2020).  
153. The harsh reality of this law is that it still promotes discrimination against same-sex couples 
that wish to procreate using one partner’s genetic material. The laws of New York do however recognize 
second parent adoptions by same-sex couples. In re Adoption of J.J., 984 N.Y.S.2d 841, 846 (Fam. Ct. 
Queens Co. 2014) (holding that, in a matter of first impression, adoption of twins conceived with birth 
father spouse’s sperm and an anonymous egg donor’s egg could be approved for finalization despite 
statutory ban against surrogacy contracts). The New York Legislature is currently discussing proposed 
legislation of the “Child-Parent Security Act of 2017” which would lift the ban on gestational surrogacy 
agreements in New York State. This discussion follows New Jersey’s recent legislation that lifted a 
nearly thirty-year ban on surrogacy. Harriet N. Cohen & Kristen E. Marinaccio, Surrogacy in New York: 
Boon or Bane? N.Y. L. J. (July 27, 2018),  
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/07/27/0730sscohen-surrogacy-in-new-york-boon-or-
bane [https://perma.cc/S9R2-9B37]. 
154. Michigan Surrogate Parenting Act, M.C.L. §§ 722. 851-863.   
155. Id.  
156. Id.  
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contracts.157 Intended parents in these states are not always granted their 
parental rights as they thought they would be at the time of contracting even 
though the state does not have legislation blocking the enforcement of the 
contract. The issuance of a parentage judgment requires the involvement of 
the court and the possibility that the intended parents may run into 
procedural and legal challenges in successfully securing their parental 
rights. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho, for example, has refused to issue a 
declaratory judgment to the intended parents determining the parentage of 
a child even though Idaho has not enacted any surrogacy legislation.158 The 
court refused despite the request from the gestational carrier who had no 
genetic relationship to the child.159 But because the court declined to address 
whether the underlying surrogacy contract was in violation of public policy, 
the legality of surrogacy in Idaho still remains unclear.160 Additionally, the 
Arizona Legislature has not yet addressed whether to allow compensated 
surrogacy despite striking a statute that prohibited surrogacy contracts in 
total—even when uncompensated.161 Arizona judges will typically allow 
heterosexual intended parents who have used their own egg and sperm to 
obtain a pre-birth order declaring them the legal parents of a child that is 
born through surrogacy.162 However, judges will not issue the same pre-
birth order to same-sex couples and heterosexual couples using donated 
eggs or sperm.163 These parents must wait until the child is born to undergo 
the lengthy adoption process of their genetic child.164  
 
 
157. Kentucky, for example, does not have law governing surrogacy, and pre-birth orders will 
vary by court venue. Judges tend to be more favorable to married couples. In Pennsylvania, court venue 
will dictate results in Pennsylvania, with more conservative judges refusing to grant pre-birth orders. 
U.S. Surrogacy Law by State, THE SURROGACY EXPERIENCE, 
https://www.thesurrogacyexperience.com/u-s-surrogacy-law-by-state.html [https://perma.cc/UW7Y-
6R3C].  
158. In re Doe, 160 Idaho 360 (2016). 
159. In Doe, the intended parents contracted with the gestational carrier and her husband, to carry 
a child conceived from the intended father’s sperm and a donor egg. Id. The district court cited Idaho 
Code §10-1201 as its authority and stated that “Idaho law already provides a statutory means by which 
parties can become parents when using a gestational surrogate—the termination of that gestational 
surrogate’s parental rights and the adoption of the child.” Id. at 361. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating 
that there was no legal basis on which it could have issued the judgment. Id. at 362.  
160. Id. at 362.   
161. Soos v. Super. Ct. In & For County of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1994) 
(declaring that A.R.S. § 25-218, the surrogate statute, affects a fundamental liberty interest and, 
therefore, violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States and 
Arizona Constitutions).  
162. Learn About the Law Covering Surrogacy in Arizona, NEW BEGINNINGS SURROGACY 
SERVICES, LLC, (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.nbsurrogacy.com/law-covering-surrogacy-in-arizona/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZGR9-HY4L].  
163. Id.  
164. Id.  
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A. Functionalism and State Surrogacy Legislation  
According to the principles of functionalism, when disorganization 
occurs in one sector, various societal components must be adjusted in order 
for the system to change.165 Since there is utter disorganization in the family 
sector caused by the confusing and inconsistent application of surrogacy 
laws, it is the duty of society to turn to another component, like politics, to 
create systemic change. Unfortunately, persuading Congress to enact a 
favorable, uniform, and comprehensive surrogacy law will be a challenge 
under the functionalist notion that members of society should not take an 
active role in societal change.166 Functionalism’s discouragement of 
activism is ironic because it is the absence of legislation by the political 
sector that is the root cause for the dysfunction in the family sector. 
However, the interconnection of each component in society is necessary for 
the survival of that society, and therefore, functionalism requires that 
society work together to achieve what is best as a whole.167 
Functionalism supports the legislation passed in states with favorable 
surrogacy laws under the notion that family is one of the most integral 
components of society.168 Social arrangements that promote and ensure 
family protection are supported, whereas those that weaken family 
protection are disfavored.169 States with strict legislation banning and 
criminalizing surrogacy exacerbate infertility chaos, and weaken the family 
sector. For the family sector to return to a balanced state, society must find 
a way to actively engage in passing favorable surrogacy legislation.  
Louisiana has enacted the most alarming surrogacy legislation of all of 
the states.170 Even though there is a clear law, its discriminatory effect 
moves the state towards an even deeper disequilibrium.171 Under 
functionalism, it is more beneficial to have no law than to have one that 
further pushes the family sector out of harmony. At first glance, Louisiana’s 
discriminatory legislation does appear to align with traditional functionalist 
beliefs. This is mainly because same-sex marriage was far from being 
legally recognized when this theory emerged, and the leading theorists172 
 
 
165. Crossman, supra note 23. 
166. Id.  
167. Id.  
168. Id. 
169. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of Talcott Parson’s views on 
ensuring family protection.  
170. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2718 to :2720.15; supra notes 142- 44.  
171. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.   
172. See Mooney et al., supra note 22, for a discussion on the three prominent functionalist 
theorists.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
318  WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 12:2 
 
 
 
tended to display homophobic views while developing their work.173 Since 
the landmark Supreme Court decision Obergefell v. Hodges,174 
functionalists have no choice but to legally recognize same-sex 
relationships as an acceptable substitute for heterosexuality. Functionalist 
theorist Parsons traditionally believed that in order to preserve procreation, 
it was essential for procreation to occur within a stable, legally recognized 
relationship.175 Now that same-sex marriage is a legally recognized 
relationship and same-sex couples can have genetically related children 
through surrogacy, functionalist theorists could coherently support same-
sex procreation instead of Louisiana’s statute.  
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
Even though Congress has little direct authority to legislate family law 
matters,176 there are various indirect approaches that “have resulted in 
significant federal impact on a myriad of family law questions.”177 One 
viable approach to enacting a federal statute that mandates the enforcement 
of gestational surrogacy contracts is for Congress to apply its broad 
Commerce Clause power.178 This would be a plausible application of 
 
 
173. Theoretical Perspectives on Sex, supra note 29. 
174. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that “the right to marry is a 
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and 
that liberty.”). 
175. Theoretical Perspectives on Sex, supra note 29.   
176. Family Law: Congress’s Authority to Legislate on Domestic Relations Questions, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, (Sept. 13, 2012),  
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL31201 [https://perma.cc/69HC-7G2V]. 
177. Id. For example, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996, which 
regulated marriage and barred same-sex married couples from being recognized as spouses for purposes 
of federal laws. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 1 U.S.C.A. §7; 28 
U.S.C.A. §1738C, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 
at 2584. In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down the definition of marriage as unconstitutional in 
violation of the 5th Amendment Due Process Clause. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775. In 2015, the remaining 
provisions of the Defense of Marriage Act were struck down in violation of the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and states must recognize lawful same-sex marriages 
performed in other states. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2608.  However, it is important to note that there is 
no direct indication that DOMA was struck down because Congress lacked the general authority to enact 
a family law regulation.  
178. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (declining to comment on whether the Partial-
Birth Abortion Act of 2013 constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause). However, it can be intimated in light of this declination, that the Commerce Clause could 
feasibly extend to abortion and surrogacy since the necessary medical instruments may travel in 
interstate commerce, and women may travel to another jurisdiction in order to obtain abortion or 
surrogacy services; see also Makenzie B. Russo, Senior Thesis, The Crazy Quilt of Laws: Bringing 
Uniformity to Surrogacy Laws in the United States, TRINITY COLLEGE SENIOR THESES AND PROJECTS 
(2016) (discussing that an additional way to “establish uniformity for surrogacy laws in the United States 
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Congress’s power since intended parents and surrogates are often matched 
interstate, these parties may have to travel to fertility clinics interstate, and 
the tools and equipment used in in-vitro fertilization procedures likely travel 
in interstate commerce. Moreover, this would be a wise use of the 
Commerce Clause because the use of federal power would compensate for 
the current inconsistent patchwork of laws among the states.  
A uniform surrogacy statute allows the parties to rely only on one 
central authority. Individuals choosing to begin the surrogacy process would 
have the ability to enter into an agreement either interstate, or in their home 
state, with the knowledge that their parental rights were secure. Gestational 
surrogates could enter into these contracts without the ability to change their 
minds about parentage later on, or alternatively, would not risk being 
declared the legal mother against their intentions. If a breach of agreement 
did occur, the injured party would be guaranteed monetary remedies. 
Finally, judges would be mandated to issue parentage judgments and would 
not have the ability to deny parents of their legal rights based on moral or 
ethical biases. 
CONCLUSION 
It is in our nation’s best interest for Congress to exercise its enumerated 
power and resolve the unpredictability encompassing the current surrogacy 
field. The sociological theory of functionalism requires that when a sector 
of society is dysfunctional, social change must occur to avoid forcing the 
entire system into disequilibrium.179 State legislation (or lack thereof), as it 
currently stands, is unsustainable for the future of the family sector. This 
proposed legislation would allow one of the most important sectors in 
society180 to function at its highest productivity. As a result, other sectors 
would be influenced to make beneficial changes, strengthening the overall 
stability of our nation. Functionalism supports and requires favorable 
federal surrogacy legislation.
 
 
would be for advocacy groups to formulate a reasonable, yet comprehensive law and take the issue to 
individual state legislators”).  
179. Crossman, supra note 23.  
180. Crossman, supra note 23; Mooney et al., supra note 22, at 29.  
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